We estimate implied cost of equity capital (r e ) for a sample of firms from 1984 to 1998 using the Ohlson and Juettner (2000) model that does not make restrictive assumptions about clean surplus and payout policies. We find that r e is strongly positively associated with conventional risk factors such as earnings variability, systematic and unsystematic return volatility, and leverage, and is negatively associated with analyst following. These associations are robust to controls for industry membership and to running the regression in changes instead of levels. Our results support the Ohlson-Juettner metric as a robust and appealing measure of r e .
Introduction
Understanding how stock prices relate to earnings forecasts is an important aspect of equity analysis. The cost of equity capital (r e ) is a summary measure of risk as perceived by equity investors and is the critical link between stock prices and earnings forecasts. Accordingly, measuring r e and identifying the causes of its variation has received considerable attention.
The paper makes two main contributions. First, it tests a new measure of r e that does not suffer from some of the deficiencies of prior measures of r e . Second, it provides new evidence regarding the theoretical factors as well as other commonly cited factors that have been used to explain the variation in r e . We first provide the motivation and the description of the new measure of r e and then describe the factors that we use to explain the variation in r e .
Traditionally, r e has been measured using realized stock returns. However, the weaknesses of using realized returns have been well documented [Miller (1977) , Fama and French (1997) , Elton (1999) , Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) ]. An alternative approach is to infer r e from the current stock price and the future expected dividends. However, dividend forecasts are not directly available as analysts provide only earnings forecasts. Thus, one needs to make assumptions about payout policies to forecast dividends. This is not appealing on two grounds. First, such payout assumptions (typically a full-payout assumption) are rarely empirically descriptive, and second, given the Modigliani-Miller theorem, absent market frictions and asymmetric information, dividend policies should not affect market values. This exercise is further complicated by the fact that since dividend payments affect future earnings, analyst earnings forecasts implicitly depend on their forecasts of dividend policies.
By focusing on value creation (earnings) rather than value distribution (dividends) Ohlson (1995) and Feltham-Ohlson (1995) provide a residual-income valuation model (RIV) that relates earnings and book values to stock prices without making any assumptions about dividend policies. Although mathematically equivalent to the dividend-discount model, RIV is more appealing than the dividend-discounting model in computing r e because it maps earnings to stock prices with less restrictive assumptions. Accordingly, researchers have begun to use RIV to estimate the implied r e [Botosan (1997) , Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) , and Claus and Thomas (1999) ], as well as use it as a model for valuation [Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) ].
RIV, however, suffers from the following problems pointed out by Ohlson (2000) . First, "clean surplus," an assumption necessary to go from discounting dividends to discounting earnings, does not hold on a per share basis. Second, even on a total equity basis, RIV does not work if buying shares is a positive NPV investment from the perspective of "new" shareholders.
Third, many accounting rules violate the clean surplus relation. Fourth, analysts do not forecast book values, which are a critical ingredient of RIV. Finally, using the RIV model also requires assumptions about terminal values and the associated assumptions about future return on common equity. Once again, analysts do not directly forecast future return on common equity.
Researchers typically assume that the return on equity regresses to industry median after some period of time. Thus, using RIV often results in "too many degrees of freedom" problem.
Using the RIV model in the absence of explicit book value forecasts requires that we infer the implied book value forecasts using a three-step procedure: (a) Forecast dividend payouts based on the history of payouts. (b) Assume clean surplus on a per share basis. (c) Use the EPS forecasts, dividend projections, and clean surplus to arrive at forecasts of book value.
Thus, in the absence of explicit book value forecasts, one is forced to forecast dividends, assume clean surplus on a per share basis, and then derive the future book values per share. This negates the conceptual advantages of RIV. A valuation model that does not use book values as its underpinnings is thus more appealing. Ohlson and Juettner (2000) provide an alternative to RIV. Instead of using book values, the Ohlson-Juettner model uses expected EPS capitalized at r e . The model has the following appealing features: (1) It allows one to work directly with analysts' earnings forecasts, i.e., it "connects" with the analysts' view of the world. (2) It does not require one to forecast dividends beyond the forthcoming period. (3) It does not assume clean surplus on a per share basis and therefore does not suffer from the problems cited in Ohlson (2000) . We therefore use the OhlsonJuettner (2000) model to estimate the implied r e . In addition to running levels regressions, we also examine how changes in r e across time correlate with changes in measures of firm risk as perceived by equity investors.
We find that while r e has declined over 1984-1998 consistent with the decline in risk-free rates (r f ), the risk premium (r e -r f ) has actually increased slightly. There is also a substantial cross sectional variation in r e across industries. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that risk factors such as systematic risk (β), unsystematic risk, variability of accounting measures, and leverage are all positively correlated with r e , and the number of analysts is negatively correlated with r e . The results hold whether we run the regressions on a pooled sample across firms or on a pooled sample for each year. The results also hold when we use the risk premium (r e -r f , where r f is the yield on a 10-year Treasury Bond) as the dependent variable. The relationship between return volatility measures and r e continues to be strong even after controlling for industry effects.
In contrast, when we use RIV to infer r e , the coefficients do not have the expected signs and β merely proxies for industry effects.
To test the robustness of our results, we run regressions in changes instead of levels. r e continues to increase with increases in unsystematic risk, variability in accounting measures, and leverage. Changes in systematic risk (β) and analyst following, however, do not correlate with changes in r e because β and analyst following vary more across firms in an industry, than they vary across time for firms in our sample. Once again, if we use the RIV model to estimate r e , the coefficients are not as expected and industry effects dominate.
Overall, the results show that in contrast to the Ohlson (1995) RIV model, the OhlsonJuettner (2000) model provides a more robust and meaningful measure of r e in the sense that r e correlates with the commonly cited risk factors as expected. This supports using the OhlsonJuettner measure for capital budgeting and valuation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the Ohlson-Juettner (2000) model. Section 3 describes the factors that we consider as influencing r e . Section 4 describes data and presents summary statistics. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
Model
We use the Ohlson-and-Juettner (2000) model without modification. We reproduce the relevant aspects of the model below for readers' convenience.
Consider valuation at date 0 P 0 = price per share, date t = 0 dps t = expected dps, date t ( 1 t ≥ ) eps t = expected eps, date t ( 1 t ≥ ) r e = R e -1 = the cost of equity capital, or the discount factor Assumption A1. 
is any sequence of numbers that satisfy the mild transversality condition 0 
From equations (1) and (2) comparability across firms, we compute the price-to-forthcoming-earnings ratios only at the beginning of a firm's fiscal year, i.e., we divide the price at the beginning of a fiscal year by the expected forthcoming annual EPS for that year. The expected EPS is thus free of the influence of quarterly disclosures since it extends 1 year from the date of price measurement.
Hypotheses
Given that r e is a notional concept and can only be inferred from stock prices and stated expectations of the future, one way to rationalize or justify any measure of r e is to study its relationship with those variables that affect a firm's riskiness as perceived by investors. In this section, we describe the factors that we believe affect r e . Note that the Ohlson (1995) and Ohlson-Juettner (2000) model make no predictions about the causes of variation in r e . Our dependent variable is r e as measured using the Ohlson-Juettner (2000) model. To adjust for the effect of changes in risk-free rates, we also use the risk premium r e -r f as the dependent variable, where r f is the prevailing yield on the 10-year Treasury bond.
For comparison, we also measure r e using the residual income valuation model as implemented by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) , but our paper is different in two major ways. First, we do not use the price-earnings ratio (or market-to-book) as an independent variable to control for market mispricing and anomalies. This is because our dependent variable r e determines the PE ratio and therefore using the PE ratio as an independent variable would result in a mis-specified regression. Second, we do not use any controls for growth because we use analysts' earnings growth forecasts to compute r e . These differences imply that our paper should not be viewed as a validation/repudiation of Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) . We use their implementation of RIV as it represents the "state of the art" in the literature.
Return Volatility
We now turn to the factors that affect the variation in r e . The capital asset pricing model predicts a positive association between a firm's β and r e . We estimate β for each firm year observation based on a regression of 60 months of lagged monthly returns against the corresponding monthly CRSP value weighted index.
In addition to β, prior studies have also shown an association between unsystematic risk and future stock returns [Malkiel (1997) ]. To extract unsystematic risk from total return volatility we run annual regressions of daily returns against the daily CRSP value weighted index and use the residuals from the regression as a proxy for unsystematic risk.
Information Environment
Disclosure research has argued that firms that are better "connected" with information intermediaries such as analysts and institutional investors have lower r e . This is because easy availability of information lowers the information asymmetry between a firm and its investors and lowers the informational risk for investors. Diamond and Verrechia (1991) show theoretically that greater disclosure can lead to greater liquidity, which in turn lowers the costs of capital. Brennan, Jegadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) show that firms with greater analyst coverage are quicker to react to market-wide common information. Botosan (1997) documents a negative association between the level of disclosure and r e . Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1998) document that more disclosure can lead to greater liquidity, lower bid-ask spreads, and a lower r e .
There are a large set of proxies such as number of analysts following a stock, trading volume, bid-ask spreads, and institutional investment that reflect the multi-dimensional nature of information environment. However, Barth and Hutton (1999) and Mohanram (2000) show that these measures are highly correlated with each other and using any one of them suffices.
Accordingly, we use the number of analysts as our proxy for information environment and expect a negative association between analyst following and r e .
Earnings Volatility
There is anecdotal as well as empirical evidence [Barth, Elliott and Finn (1999) ] that firms that show stable and increasing earnings command a lower r e . Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) focus on the predictability of analyst forecasts to measure earnings volatility. We examine whether firms with a more stable performance as measured by return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), earnings per share (EPS), and EPS growth have lower r e . Modigliani and Miller (1958) show that r e should be an increasing function of its leverage. Fama and French (1992) demonstrate a positive association between leverage measured using market value of equity and ex-post stock returns. We expect a positive association between r e and the ratio of the book value of a firm's long-term debt and the market value of its equity.
Leverage

Industry Effects
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) find that industry effects are the dominant factor in explaining cross sectional differences in r e . They find that β has no explanatory power when industry dummies are used and they conclude that β merely proxies for industry differences in r e .
We also include industry controls in our tests by measuring the average of r e as well as the risk premium for all other firms in the same industry as per the Fama-French (1997) classification.
Data and Summary Statistics
Our sample covers the I/B/E/S data from 1984 to 1998. We selected those firms that met the following conditions: (1) at least five analyst forecasts per year in I/B/E/S; (2) market capitalization of $100 million as of the end of 1998 fiscal year; (3) returns data in CRSP; (4) accounting data in Compustat. We imposed these criteria to ensure adequate and reliable data about analysts' expectations of earnings growth.
Returns data are obtained from the CRSP daily as well as monthly databases. We used daily returns to compute measures of unsystematic risk and used monthly returns to compute β for each of the firm-years. Accounting data is obtained from COMPUSTAT's annual database.
Given that our proxies for firm-specific characteristics rely on accounting information, we use the beginning of a fiscal year as the measurement point for our analysis. This ensures better matching of the independent variables with the dependent variables. We measure the variances of ROA, ROE, EPS, and EPS growth using accounting data from five prior years. Table 1 to 10.26% in 1998. However, a large part of this decline can be attributed to the decline in the r f .
The risk-premium (r e -r f ) actually increased from a mean of 2.78% in 1984 to a mean of 4.71% in
1998.
Figure 1-A illustrates the change in mean r e and r e-r f over time. While r e declined over the period, it did not decline as sharply as the decline in r f . To verify that this is not due to a change in the identity of firms included in the sample, Figure 1 -B plots r e and r e -r f for firms that had data for the entire period from 1984-1998. Average r e also declined from 13.30% to 9.00%, while average risk premium increased from 1.89% to 3.60%. Table 2 looks at the distribution of r e and r e -r f across industries in the two extreme years of our analysis. In both years, there is a great diversity in the levels of these variables across the industries. In 1984, industries such as utilities (SIC 49), petroleum (SIC 29) and furniture and fixtures (SIC 25) enjoyed the lowest r e , while financial institutions (SIC 60 and 61) faced the highest r e . By 1998, there were some significant changes. While utilities continued to have the lowest r e , financial institutions (SIC 60 and 61) now have low r e as well. In general, the distribution of industry average r e appears to be much tighter in 1998. We control for such industry effects by using the mean industry r e and mean industry risk premiums as control variables. Both r e and r e -r f are strongly negatively correlated to the number of analyst estimates (NUMEST). They are also positively correlated to leverage (Debt/Equity), but the correlation is weak. Both measures are also strongly positively correlated to β as well as UNSYST (unsystematic risk). This differs from Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) who find a much weaker association when they compute r e using RIV. r e and r e -r f are also strongly positively correlated with two of our earnings variance measures -the variance of ROA (ROAVAR) and the variance of ROE (ROEVAR). The correlation with the EPS variance measures and the analyst forecast variance (STDEV) is a bit weaker. Note that ROE and ROA are return measures like r e and are scale independent while EPS does not account for investment and may be scale dependent.
The earnings variance measures are strongly correlated amongst themselves. In addition, the ROA and ROE variance measures appear to be strongly correlated to UNSYST, the unsystematic return variance measure. This is not surprising, as they both measure different aspects of firm specific variance. Factor analysis of the five measures of earnings variability produces a single factor with an eigenvalue of greater than one, which explains slightly more than 52% of the variance in the variables. The factor loadings are ROAVAR (0.800), ROEVAR (0.844), EPSGRVAR (0.687), EPSVAR (0.689), and STDEV (0.49671). The loadings are strongest on variance of ROA and ROE, which have the highest correlation with r e and r e -r f . NUMEST is strongly negatively associated with r e , indicating that firms with greater analyst following face lower r e (or that analysts shy away from risky firms). Both β and UNSYST (unsystematic risk) are strongly positively correlated with r e even after controlling for industry effects. The earnings variance measure (EARNVAR) is also positively associated with r e , indicating that firms with more variable earnings are penalized through higher r e , while firms with more stable earnings have lower r e . Leverage (Debt/Equity) is also positively associated with r e , which supports Modigliani-Miller (1958) and Fama-French (1992) . The industry measure of r e (INDMEAN:r e ) is, not surprisingly, strongly positively associated with r e . The regression has an adjusted R 2 of 38%.
Results
Pooled Regressions
One potential problem with the regression could be that industry effects dominate the results, both in terms of explanatory power as well as the potential correlations with the other independent variables. To account for this, we run the same regression without the industry control variable in Regression 2. The adjusted R 2 does drop, but it is still at around 22.45%.
Further, all relationships from regression 1 continue to hold. β now has a larger association with r e , both in terms of the coefficient (which almost doubles) as well as the significance level. Thus, although there is there is a strong industry-specific component to β [regression 2], β remains significant even after controlling for industry effects [regression 1].
Regressions 3 and 4 rerun the earlier tests with risk-premium (r e -r f ) as the dependent variable. Regression 3 uses the mean industry risk premium (INDMEAN: r e -r f ) as the control for industry effects. The results are similar to those for r e both in terms of the significance levels of the variables as well as their explanatory power. and 4 present the results for risk premium, which are qualitatively similar.
Year-by-Year Regressions
We also run year-by-year regressions for r e against the independent variables for each of the years from 1984 to 1998. Table 5 presents the summary coefficients and t-statistics for these regressions using a methodology similar to Fama-MacBeth (1973) . Since auto-correlation among the coefficients in the annual regressions can bias the true standard errors downward and bias the t-statistics upward, we correct the t-statistics for auto-correlation as in Bernard (1995).
1 Table 5 , Panel A Removing the control for average r e of other firms in the industry lowers the explanatory power from an average of around 37.6% to 29.8%. The results for risk premium are also similar. 1 Another alternative is to calculate Z statistics from the distribution of the t-statistics using information on the actual number of observations in each year-by-year regression. We find similar levels of significance if we use such an approach. We prefer to present the results using our approach as we can better control for the effects of auto-correlation in the coefficients, which can be quite substantial.
Changes in Cost of Equity Capital and Risk Premium Across Time
So far, we have run regressions in levels. Since most of our variables are not scale dependent there is no a priori reason for running the regressions in changes. However, validating the results in a regression in changes provides an additional test for robustness. The time series regressions pose a problem because as shown in table 6, panel A, some of the independent variables are relatively stable across time although they vary significantly in the cross section. To increase the power of our change regressions, we measure the change in variables over the entire period from 1984 to 1998. This also provides us non-overlapping, and therefore independent, observations of the earnings variance, which requires at least five years of data. Table 6 , Panel A Table 6 , Panel A presents the summary statistics of the variables in 1984 and 1998 for the 200 firms for which we have data in both years. As before, the mean r e declined from around 14.5% in 1984 to 9.6% in 1998, a decline of around 4.9%. However, since r f declined from 11.4% to 5.30%, the risk premium actually increased from 3.1% to 4.3%. The number of analysts (NUMEST) has barely changed across this period with a mean of around 16.5. As can be expected, β has declined over this period (from a mean of 1.14 to 0.94) as these firms have become larger and somewhat more diversified as compared to other firms. However, unsystematic risk (UNSYST) and earnings variance (EARNVAR) increased over this period, indicating that firm specific or unsystematic risk may have actually increased over this period.
Leverage (Debt/Equity) declined over this period, though the change was not significant. Firms that had a significant increase in analyst following (Low to High for NUMEST) saw a greater decline in r e and smaller increase in risk premium (r e -r f ), indicating the potential effect of the increase in analyst following on lowering r e . Firms with the greatest increase in earnings variability (Low to High for EARNVAR) had far less steep declines in r e and much greater increases in r e -r f , consistent with their r e increasing with increasing variability in accounting measures. Firms with declining earnings variability actually saw a large drop in risk premium -a possible reward for a reduction in accounting variability. The same trend is seen for unsystematic return variance (UNSYST). This is consistent with penalties for increasing unsystematic risk and closely mirrors the trend for earnings variability. The results for β are less clear, with firms with increasing β actually seeing greater declines in r e and lesser increase in (r er f ). As we saw before, β is strongly influenced by industry effects, which we do not control for here. The results for leverage are in the direction hypothesized, with firms with the greatest increase in leverage (Low to High) seeing smaller declines in r e and greater increases in (r e -r f ). Table 7 presents the results of regressions with the change in r e as the dependent variable and the changes in the underlying variables as the independent variables. As mentioned above, the changes are measured as the difference between the 1984 levels and the 1998 levels. Even over such a long horizon, there is not much change in some of the explanatory variables for a given firm. This lowers the power of our tests.
Regression 1 has change in r e (∆r e ) as the dependent variable and includes controls for Regressions 3 and 4 are the same as regressions 1 and 2 except that the dependent variable is now the change in risk premium (r e -r f ) instead of the change in r e . The results are also similar to regressions 1 and 2 further confirming the robustness of the Ohlson-Juettner (2000) measure. (2001) 
Summary and Conclusions
Measuring the cost of equity capital (r e ) has received considerable attention because r e is a summary measure of risk as perceived by equity investors. Prior research has predominantly used average realized returns as a measure of r e . Recently researchers have used the residual income valuation model (RIV) to compute the implied r e . Using RIV is a major improvement over using realized returns, but the RIV model has four major weaknesses as pointed out by
Ohlson (2000): (1) (2000) measure of r e and the factors that are typically supposed to drive r e suggest that the OhlsonJuettner (2000) model provides a useful way to measure r e for corporate finance and investment decisions.
Third, since the Ohlson-Juettner (2000) model allows us to directly incorporate priceearnings ratios into the measurement of r e , we no longer need to use the price-earnings ratio as an independent variable. This leads to a better specification since the price-earnings ratio is an alternative representation of investors' perception of growth and risk (r e ) rather than a factor that determines r e .
Finally, we test the robustness of our results by regressing changes in r e on changes in explanatory variables. Since most of our results from the levels regressions continue to hold in the changes regression, it provides further support that the Ohlson-Juettner (2000) model provides a robust measure of r e that is a summary representation of risk as perceived by equity investors. 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Cost Of Capital Risk Premium
Figure B: Fixed sample from 1984 to 1998 (The subset of firms that had data for all 15 years.) Industries with at least 5 firms in 1998. Table presents the mean r e and r e -r f for the industries in 1984 and 1999. Since r f is the same for all industries in a given year, r e -r f is provided here for convenience. It does not provide any additional information beyond the cross sectional variation in r e . Since the number of firms varies substantially over, it is not meaningful to draw inferences from changes in r e across time. In later tables, we look at changes in r e and r e -r f on a firm-by-firm basis. Average r e of all other firms in the same industry INDMEAN:RIV:(r e -r f ) Average (r e -r f ) of all other firms in the same industry 
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